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INTRODUCTION
In May, 1910 the American Stock Exchange was officially organized as
the New York Curb Market Association. The Association's constitution
specifically prohibited members from trading in securities listed on the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) . This prohibition, which became known as
the "New York Rule", meant that no stock could be dual listed on the two
national exchanges located in New York. If a firm's stock was listed on the
ASE and then applied for listing on the NYSE and was accepted, the day it
began trading on the NYSE its stock was automatically delisted from the ASE.
This practice continued uninterrupted until August 23, 1976, when Varo,
Inc. became listed on the NYSE, yet continued to be listed and traded on
the ASE. Subsequently four other firms likewise became listed on the
NYSE, yet stayed on the ASE. An obvious and interesting question is the
effect of this dual listing on the market-making in these stocks.
One could postulate two possible scenarios of what would happen under
dual-listing conditions. Notably, the expected effect on price movements
would be obviously different. The purpose here is to examine price
The author acknowledges the data collection assistance of James Webb,
Young Rim, Dave Smith, and Milan Saric.
Professor of Finance, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
A full discussion of the history of the American Stock Exchange and
its relationship to the NYSE is contained in, Robert W. Doede, "The
Monopoly Power of the New York Stock Exchange" (unpublished dissertation,
University of Chicago, 1967).
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movements surrounding the time of the dual- listing to determine any changes
in price movements compared to price changes for a sample of ASE stocks
that became listed on the NYSE and gave up their listing on the ASE.
The initial section discusses the alternative expectations one might
derive for a stock that becomes dual-listed on the two national exchanges.
The second section considers prior related studies in this area. In section
three, we discuss samples employed and the tests used. The results are
presented and discussed in the fourth section. The final section contains
a summary and discusses the implications of the results for companies and
for capital market efficiency.
ALTERNATIVE EXPECTATIONS
The expected effect of dual- lifting is not one-sided. Some who advo-
cate the need for a central auction market would probably argue against
dual- listing because it would "fragment" the auction process. In contrast,
advocates of competition would welcome dual- listing because it would intro-
duce competing market-makers and generate the usual benefits of competition.
Fragmented Markets Hypothesis
The NYSE has consistently contended that the auction process of buy-
ing and selling securities is very efficient and has many desirable
characteristics that are of benefit to all participants. At the same time,
it is contended that the auction process is very delicate and the auction
market can be seriously hampered if it is fragmented by having different
market-makers at different locations. Specifically, it is contended that
the optimum arrangement requires that all orders come to a central physical
location to be entered into the auction process. Only in this way can the
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2
process work effectively. This is basically the reasoning used by the
NYSE when arguing for the elimination of the third market through a request
for regulation that all listed stocks only be traded on an exchange. This
argument against a fragmented market would imply that going from a central
auction market on the ASE, to a fragmented auction market split between
the ASE and NYSE would result in a poorer market with wider spreads and
probably an increase in stock price volatility.
Competitive Market Hypothesis
Those who advocate competitive market-makers argue that competition
would foster better markets. Assuming monopolistic market-makers one might
expect they could have wider than required spreads in their quotes as a
means to increase their returns. The wider spreads would mean greater price
volatility over time assuming random orders. With competition, market-
makers are forced to improve their quotes or they will not do any business
in the stock (e.g., if one market-maker is quoting the stock at 30-31 and
a competitor is quoting 30 1/4 - 30 3/4, the market-maker with the smaller
spread will do all the business on both sides of the market) . While this
is obviously an extreme example, it indicates the need for participating
market-makers to improve quotations with competition. Therefore, with com-
petition, one might expect smaller quotation spreads and hence lower stock
3
price volatility.
2
This line of reasoning has been used to defend the practice of not
allowing off-board trading. See, "Big Board Chairman and Team of Brokers
Defend Off-Floor Rule," Wall Street Journal , (October 4, 1975); "Restric-
tions on Off-Floor Market-Making Are Backed by Big Firms in Plea to SEC,"
Wall Street Journal
,
(November 29, 1976).
This is the argument made in, Seymour Smidt, "Which Road to an Effi-
cient Stock Market?" Financial Analysts Journal , Vol. 27, No. 5 (September-
October, 1971), pp. 18.
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PRIOR STUDIES
There are two studies that bear rather directly on the question of
this study. The first study by Tinic and West examined factors that in-
4
fluence dealer spreads on the OTC market. One should expect dealer spreads
on the OTC to be affected by generally the same variables as spreads for
specialist-dealers on an exchange. The interesting segment of the Tinic-
West study as related to the current paper £a that one of the variables
considered was the number of dealers making a market in a given stock. It
is pointed out that the expected relationship between spread and number of
dealers depends upon the economies of scale in the dealership function.
If there are economies of scale in carrying inventories then there should
not be a relation between the number of dealers and the spread. In con-
trast, if there are no economies of scale, then they would expect a negative
relationship because of the competitive pressure. Tinic and West hypoth-
esized a negative relation—i.e., more competing dealers, a smaller spread.
Their results using data for a single day in 1962 indicated the variable
had the expected negative sign, but was not statistically significant
because of collinearity beteeen th? number of dealers and trading volume.
The results using several days data from 1971 indicated the dealer variable
had a significant negative coefficient after taking account of volume. The
authors conclude:
4
Seha M. Tinic ar.d Richard R. Ue3t, "Competition and the Pricing of
Dealer Service in the Over-tha-Counter Stock tiarket," Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis , Vol. 7, No. 3 (June, 1972), pp. 1707-1726.
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However, even though a larger number of dealers prefer to make
markets in relatively active issues, competition among dealers tend
to reduce bid-ask spreads f all common stocks irrespective of their
level of trading activity. i>
A second study by Reilly and Slaughter considered the effect on the
market-making for a sample of stocks listed on the NYSE that rere also
quoted on the NASDAQ system as part of the third market. Specifically,
prior to April 5, 1971, a large number of stocks listed on the NYSE were
traded on the third market, but the third market quotations were not readily
available. On April 3, 1971, the quotes by CTC dealers in 30 active third
market stocks were available on the NASDAQ system. This innovation made
it possible to compare the market-making on the OTC to that existing on
the NYSE. It also made it possible to examine the short-run effects on
the market-making on the NYSE when the NYSE stocks were added to the NASDAQ
system—i.e., what effect did the introduction of a visible competitor have?
The analysis of chanses in market-miking on the NYSE after April 5
considered relative spreads in the closing quotes for the 30 stocks before
and after April 5. There was also a comparison of spreads on the NYSE and
NASDAQ after April 5th. Finally, theie was an examination of daily vola-
tility (High-Low/Low) fcr the 30 stocks on the NYSE for the 30 trading
days before and after NASDAQ.
5
Ibid.
, p. 1720.
Frank K. Reilly er.d Killiea C. Slaughter, "The Effect of Dual Markets
on Common Stock Market-Making," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analy-
sis , Vol. 8, No. 2 (March, 1973), pp. 167-182.
'i'-h:" ''.' "X.-l jf.'.'
"\ > f .. ju8-? -:. : : VoOi .v.- •:'.: .' .'.:..• ,•./".<)."•?•
%H->r>.-i Vi •.:^''.;:.::-j^--;j>:.o".i:i i '*:•.,: /.-;;::.
s"'' r*»< "' :!'>' iri3 &#"«b ,*.;. - .if;,
'••- !
.
'
i
;•'•'.
:;
'
"' : j . • • :*• *."
,.Vi^v?:: i *-V . > ?& •••< ' ?'.'.' . M
r.
.' I:'' '':.': ., :;:'}:_. :>.
:
;'';"':"•>
...' " ., '•
:
'
;
I • :.' •"3 ao.s
...
I .(!.
;'' '/-' ;•'
- vu v ••;. -,. , -'.
•X!:-
V.i'..
'
:>':.
-i
; :.;
.
-.-.
.
."' •
.-'...-/v
t"
. i. <(/>
,
• 'i ; ;: •
,J..' •
. ;: .
i
-6-
The results indicated no significant change in the average percent
spread before and after April 5. Regarding the change in intra-day vola-
tility, the 30 dual-listed stocks experienced a larger decline in volatility
than a randomly selected sample of stocks on the NYSE, but neither of the
declines were statistically significant. The authors concluded:
Overall, it appears that the inclusion of these 30 stocks on
the NASDAQ system did not affect their volatility on the NYSE.
7
In summary, these prior results would tend to support the competitive
hypothesis. Specifically, the Tinic-West results indicate that an increase
in the number of dealers causes a decline in the spread and, therefore,
one would expect a decline in price volatility. The Reilly-Slaughter
results that indicated no change would not support either hypothesis. It
was pointed out that the no change reg'.lts could be caused by the fact that
the inclusion on NASDAQ of these very active third-market stocks did not
have any further effect on markets that already were very competitive.
DATA AND TESTS
Sample
Since Varo, Inc., became dual-listed, four other companies became
listed on the NYSE but retained their listing on the ASE. Therefore, as
of the end of 1976, there were five companies that were dual-listed.
These five companies and the dates they became dual-listed are contained
in Table 1. Any analysis of the effect of dual-listing must consider the
objection that the analysis could be biased because the market-making on
the NYSE is superior due to the greater resources of the NYSE specialists
7
Ibid.
, p. 178.
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and the larger membership on the NYSE. Therefore, we considered a control
sample of stocks that had become listed on the NYSE, but did delist from
the ASE. Three of the control non-dual listed companies switched before
Varo, Inc. while two of the companies made the change after Varo, Inc. The
non-dual companies and the dates of the change are also included in Table 1.
Tests
Given a desire to examine the effect of dual-listing on market-making
in the stock's involved, the ideal analysis would involve an examination
of the quotation spreads before and after the dual-listing for the sample
stocks. These data are not available on a daily basis.
What is available is an intra-day measure of volatility that should
be influenced by the liquidity of the stock-namely the high and low price
for each day. Therefore, for each day surrounding the dual-listing (or
change in listing for the non-dual firms) we computed the ratio: high
price minus low price/low price. This is the daily range divided by the
low price for the day to derive a normalized range value. One would expect
this ratio to reflect the market-making for a given stock—i.e., a change
in liquidity should be reflected in a change in the spread for the stock
and also the relative trading range. Specifically, a stock with a smaller
percent spread should also have a smaller range of trading on a daily
basis all else equal.
As with almost any time series analysis that covers different periods
for alternative members of the sample, it is necessary to adjust the ratio
for market effects. To adjust the stock ratios, we derived a comparable
daily normalized range value for the aggregate market and subtracted this
value from the value for the individual stock. The daily market ratio is
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computed using the high and low value for the Dow Jones Industrial Average
(DJIA) . This market ratio is somewhat b-.ased because it is the ultimate
high and low—i.e., the daily high value for the DJIA is derived by taking
the individual high prices for each of the 30 stocks that are included in
the DJIA and compute the average; the low is the individual low values, etc.
The point is, the computed high and low values are not averages that ever
existed during the day, but are the potentially highest and lowest values
that could have been derived if all the stocks hit their high and low
points at the same moment in tine. As such, it is a somewhat biased estimate
of the market range. Because the biar is consistent over time it should not
have an effect on the results. It is mentioned because in some cases the
"net" normalized range value for given stocks is negative—i.e., the mar-
ket's percent range was larger than the stock's range. These negative
market-adjusted range values can partially be explained by the computation
of the market's range ratio.
Finally, the daily range figure is quite volatile, even after it is
adjusted for the market. Therefore, we used a moving average to smooth
the series in order to aid the visual analysis of the series. A five day
moving average was employed. Even with the moving average the series
appears to be quite volatile.
Time Period
The moving average, market-adjusted range series was derived for each
of the ten stocks for 30 trading days prior to the dual-listing (or switch
from the ASE to the NYSE) . The prior period should encompass a period be-
fore any announcement of the change and also allow some consideration of
what happens just prior to a change. The analysis considered 45 trading
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days after the dual- listing (or switch). A preliminary analysis considered
30 trading days after the change but the results seemed to indicate that the
series had not settled down within this period. Hence, the total period
of analysis for each stock extended from 30 trading days before the change
to 45 trading days after the change.
PRESENTATION OF RESULTS
The discussion of results considers the 12 graphs—one for each of
the individual stocks and a graph of the average for the five dual-listed
stocks and an average for the five non-dual- lis ted stocks. Also the
average results for various time intervals surrounding the change are
contained in Table 2 and are considered. Within each subsection we briefly
consider each of the individual stocks and then the average results.
Dual-Listed Stocks
Prior to the change to dual-listing the market-adjusted daily hi-lo
range for Varo (Figure 1) was generally between 2.5 and 3.5 percent and
averaged 3 percent for the prior 30 days. Notably, immediately after the
dual -listing the range declined substantially to about .5 percent on the
tenth day and averaged only 1.6 percent for the first 20 days after dual-
listing. This is obviously a very impressive effect and would indicate a
significant effect of competition in connection with this change. Un-
fortunately, the range began to increase and actually had several very
large ranges between day 23 and 30. This range settled down to between 2.0
and 2.5 percent by the end of the test period (it averaged 2.33 percent
the last 15 days) . While the ending range was below the range prior to the
dual-listing, the trend was clearly up after the initial sharp decline.
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The ELT, Inc. graph (Figure 2) shows an unusual pattern in that the
range declined before the dual-listing and actually experienced some increase
in the range immediately after the dual- listing. Subsequently, there was a
decline and low values from day 13 through day 32, then another increase,
and finally a decline. While the average for the 30 days after was lower
than the 30 days before, given the increase near the end, it is difficult
to suggest a trend in either direction following the dual- listing.
Frigitronics (Figure 3) probably presents the most impressive case
for dual- listing. Prior to dual- listing the range was from 2 to 6 percent
and averaged over 3 percent. Within a few days after dual-listing the
market-adjusted hi-lo range declined to almost zero and remained there until
day 35 such that the average for the first 30 days was only .37 percent.
After day 35 the range started to increase up to about 1.5 percent. Even
with the increase the average vs-lwe during the last 15 days was or.V- .87
percent which was below any of the values prior to dual- listing.
The Gearhart-Owens chart (Figure 4) is somewhat similar to Varo in
that there was a distinct decline in the market-adjusted range immediately
after the dual-listing (the average for days 1-10 was .61 percent compared
to 2.0 percent before dual-listing). This was followed by several increases
and declines, but the general trend of the cycles was upward such that the
average range for the final 15 days was above the average ranges prior to
dual-listing.
The final dual-listed graph for Sambo's Restaurants (Figure 5) is
probably the most discouraging example of the effects of dual-listing.
Except for an increase just prior to the dual- listing, the market-adjusted
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range for Sambo's was quite low indicating a very good market on the ASE
(the average for the 30 days was only .58 percent). Immediate."./ after the
dual-listing, the range returned to the low values experienced prior to
the dual-listing (the average for the first 10 days was .66 percent). Subr-
sequently the range increased sharply to over 2.5 percent followed by an-
other decline and ending with a steady increase to the 2.0-2.5 percent
level with an average of 1.S2 percent the last 15 days. Clearly the average
experience after the dual- listing war. net as good as the experience before
dual- listing.
The average results fcr the five dual" listed stocks are contained
in Figure 6. The average results in Table 2 tend to support the com-
petitive market hypothesis and yet they are also consistent with some in-
dications of increasing ranges toward the end of the test period.
Specifically, the average results are quite encouraging since all the
average values for time intervals after the dual- listing are smaller than
any of the averages for tine intervals before the dual-listing. The
average for the first 20 days following dual- listing was about half any
of the pre-lirrir.g averages. At the 3ame ti~e, the results at the end of
the test period were not cuprortive because of the clear upward trend in
the range such that the average values fcr the final 15 d-ys was 1.68 per-
cent.
Non-Dual - Listed Shocks
The graph for Craig (Figure 7) demonstrates the high volatility in
the range figures—even though they are five day moving averages. There
was a large decline right after the change in listing, followed by an
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increase, another decline and another increase. Overall, it appears the
after-change ranges were very volatile, but clearly lower on average.
The Fabricenter graph (Figure 8) was encouraging to the NYSE market
shortly after the change, but eventually daily prices became more volatile
and the range increased substantially. Specifically, immediately after
the change the market-adjusted rar.gs declined fairly steadily to a negative
value between days 15 end 20 such that the average for the first 20 days
was only .35 percent. This was a very impressive performance. In contrast,
by the end of the test period the ran^e had Increase! to a point above any
of the values recorded prior to the change in listing. This is evident in
the average for the last 15 days of 1.45 percent which was larger than any
other average for the company.
The chart for Buttos Gas and Oil (Figure 9) showed a very nice pattern
of declines in the ranges prior to the change. Consistent with almost
all the charts, there was a general decline for the period immediately
after the change. Subsequently, there were two increases with peaks above
any peaks prior to the change. At the end of "he test period the range
was about the sane as before the charge (1.02 percent for the last 15
days compared to O.Sj percent for tha 30 days prior to change).
The chart for Selgiman and Lats (Figure 1C ' indicated a good market
prior to the change and a good but erratic market after the change. Specif-
ically, prior to the change, the r -.rket-adjusted range was always less than
one-half of 1 percent and or : eral days the narket-adjusted range
declined to a negative value. After the change, there was a steady decline
to a minus 1 percent, followed by an incrr - :-. to almost 2 percent and
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another decline to negative values. Again, it appears the markets
were good after the change based upon negative ranges but also more in-
consistent based upon the volatility in the ranges.
The final non-dual stock was Combustion Equipment (Figure 11). The
range prior to the change was between .5 and 2.0 percent and averaged about
1 percent. After the change the range actually increased for several days.
The range then declined sharply to about zero and ended the test period
generally increasing. Overall it appears there was no major change in
either direction.
The average for the non-dual traded stocks is contained in Figure 12.
Prior to the change, the market-adjusted range varied from about .5 to
1.5 percent and tended to increase prior to the change which might in-
dicate a loss of interest by the ASE specialist. There was a con-
sistent decline in the range during the 30 days after the change in-
dicating close attention by the NYSE specialist to the new stock. Sub-
sequently there was a small increase followed by a decrease and variations
around .5 percent prior to an increase during the last week that brought
the average to the pre-change level. Overall it appears that the average
market-adjusted range for the stocks that did not choose to become dual-
listed was about the same after the switch as before. Put another way,
the market-making on the NYSE using this rather crude measure was similar
to what it had been on the ASE.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Summary
Since 1910 there has been a "New York Rule" that banned a stock
from being listed on both the NYSE and ASE. During 1976 a number of
firms with the blessing of the ASE chose to apply for listing on the
NYSE, but also decided to retain their listing on the ASE. The purpose
of this study has been to examine the impact of this decision on the mar-
kets for these stocks. Notably there are differences of opinion as to
the potential effect of such a change. On the one hand, advocates of a
strong central auction market would expect such a "fragmentation" of the
market-making to cause an increase in stock price volatility because all
orders would not be coming to one location and, therefore, the market
would not be as good. In contrast, advocates of competitive markets would
hypothesize a decrease in the market spreads and a decrease in the price
volatility. The increased competition was expected to force the specialists
to improve their market-making. Two prior studies on the general topic
generally supported the expectations of a decline in the spread.
The results for a time series of market-adjusted daily percent
price range showed diverse results for the alternative stocks. For the
five stocks that were dual-listed, one stock clearly showed a major decline
in daily price ranges. After dual- listing, one stock showed a major
increase in the daily range, and the other three were mixed. The average
results indicated a steady decline for about three weeks after the dual-
listing and some variability at a low value. Unfortunately, the final values
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startcd shoving a steady increase. Although the overall results indicated
a lower level of range, the steady increase during the last 20-25 trading
days was quite discouraging.
The results for the stocks that went from the ASE to the NYSE and
did not choose to be dual-listed were likewise mixed. For the most part,
the range after the change was more volatile, but typically about the same
size. These were confirmed by the average results that indicated an increase
before the change, a sharp decline after, and a fairly steady pattern.
Conclusion
These results are related to the alternative hypotheses clearly do not
support the fragmented market hypothesis because the percent range figures
for the dual- listed stocks definitely do not indicate an increase in the
average volatility using the hi-lo measure. In fact, overall there is a
decline in the average market-adjusted range. Regarding the competitive
market hypothesis, the results shortly after the dual- listing supported
the hypothesis because the percent range declined to a level clearly
lower than that which prevailed prior to dual- listing. Unfortunately it
is hard to be too enthusiastic about the support because the range began
to increase during the end of the test period.
The results for the stocks that did not dual- list were generally
consistent with expectations. The market-adjusted range after listing
on the NYSE appeared to be similar to the market on the ASE.
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TABLE 1
DUAL- LISTED AND NON-DUAL" LISTE:: COMPANIES
AND DATES OF LISTING ON NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE
Dual- Listed Non-Dual Listed
Company Date Company Date
Varo, Inc. Aug. 23, 1976 Craig Aug. 2, 1976
ELT, Inc. Sept. 28, 1976 Fabric- nter Aug. 4, 1976
Frigitronicc Oct. 1, 1976 Buttes Gas and Oil Aug. 12, 1976
Gearha' t-Ovr s Industries Oct. 5, 1975 Seligman + Latz Sept. 15, 1976
Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. Oct. 13. 1976 Combustion Equipment Assoc. Sept. 22, 1976
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